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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The development phase of an offshore oil field involves a series of contracting activities 
which are no less complex than the projects themselves.  Along the years, this has lead to 
an area of expertise for the legal community in the oil and gas industry worldwide.  
 
A good illustration of this is the evolution over the years of the oil companies` procurement 
strategy for procurement of offshore installations. 
 
With ever-improving technologies available subsurface, subsea and on the processing 
facilities themselves, the complexity and magnitude of these projects for procurement of 
offshore installations have increased dramatically.  In order to cater for this increased 
complexity and magnitude (involving several contractors, subcontractors, suppliers, sub-
suppliers etc) the industry has developed the so-called EPC (Engineering, procurement and 
construction) and EPIC (Engineering, procurement, installation and commissioning) types 
of contracts. 
 
The main objective of those forms of contracts was to simplify the contracting process, 
creating a single point of responsibility and to reduce as much as possible the interfaces and 
management between engineering, procurement and construction activities.  A secondary 
objective, but no less important, was a will to reduce the overall delay between oil 
discovery and start of production, thus increasing the economic profitability of those 
massive offshore projects.   
 
In order to achieve the above and to avoid time-consuming negotiations, significant work 
and efforts were invested so as to define a fair balance between contracting parties by 
designing standard agreements.  This was first done by the oil industry in Norway with 
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edition of The Norwegian Fabrication Form1, followed-up in the United Kingdom – The 
standard contracts for UK offshore oil and gas Industry2, both of which will be detailed 
further in this dissertation and the creation of the industry mutual hold harmless scheme in 
the United Kingdom continental shelf.  
 
Central to this dissertation will be the liabilities and indemnities regimes adopted in those 
standard agreements, particularly the allocation of risks for (i) loss and damages to property 
owned by each contracting parties, (ii) personal injuries, death or illness of personnel, (iii) 
indirect or consequential losses and (iv) third party claims arising out of personnel injuries, 
illness or death, or property loss or damages suffered by third parties. The knock-for-knock 
principle and mutual hold harmless scheme will be introduced as these are the central legal 
pieces of the contracts supporting offshore installations projects.   
 
As will be addressed in this dissertation, the knock-for-knock principle and mutual hold 
harmless scheme have created by virtue of agreements a special liability regime which 
differs from what would normally be provided by each respective legal systems and 
statutes. 
 
This dissertation will also describe the liability regimes adopted in Brazil by the state-
owned oil company Petroleo Brasileiro SA – Petrobras in the so called “PNBV Contract”.  
Firstly, because as a counter-example to the regimes developed in the North Sea3, it 
illustrates perfectly the main principles.  Secondly, recent new oil field discoveries (2007) 
on the Brazilian continental shelf are extremely promising for the oil and gas industry, with 
expectations to require a significant portion of all world-wide new (or refurbished) offshore 
installations for the next 10-20 years. 
 
 
                                                 
1 The Norwegian Fabrication Form was originally edited in 1992 and subsequently reviewed. Last edition 
published in 2007. 
2 Formerly Crine Standard Contracts. See further in chapter 3.2. 
3 The North Sea connects with the rest of the Atlantic through the Dover Strait and the English Channel in the 
south and through the Norwegian Sea in the north. 
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It will also be reviewed the position at English law in respect to the effectiveness of 
liabilities and indemnities provisions, in particular, the cases derived from the Piper Alpha4 
disaster, which have opened high level discussions on the enforcement of such provisions. 
Based on those English law cases it will be present some considerations of how to draft 
effective liabilities and indemnities provisions. 
 
The main focus of this dissertation is to identify the differences between liability regimes 
used in Norway, UK and Brazil.  This in turn will be of assistance for Contractors to 
correctly identify the level of liability they may be exposed to when performing services in 
these three countries.  
  
The issue concerned with applicable local laws will not be central for this dissertation as 
most of those contracts (except the NF07 one) do provide the English Law as the governing 
law to solve any disputes that may result from the contract execution. However, the 
experience of the English courts will be discussed as a general guideline of how to draft 
effective liabilities and indemnities provisions.  
 
Finally, it is relevant to remark that when responsibilities and liabilities are split between 
contracting parties, the insurance regime also needs to be taken into consideration.  It was 
out with the realm of this dissertation to address in depth the insurance schemes and the 
associated risk allocations linked to such schemes.  It is however suggested that this 
dissertation and its structure can be used as a basis and reference point for such analysis. 
Therefore, this dissertation will focus on the legal contractual aspects only.   
                                                 
4 See further herein chapter 4.1.1 
 4
CHAPTER 2 OVERVIEW OF THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS 
 
Prior to entering into the main subject of this dissertation, this chapter will give an 
overview of the regulatory frame works for the oil and has industry in UK, Norway and 
Brazil. 
2.1 United Kingdom’s licensing system 
 
The oil and gas industry in the UK is based on a licensing system controlled and 
administrated by its Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (the 
“BERR”).  
 
The Petroleum Act 1998, which is the master regulation in the UK oil and gas sector, vests 
in the Crown the exclusive rights to search for, bore and for and get petroleum in the 
United Kingdom Continental Shelf5. However, the Secretary of State for the Department 
Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR)6, hence the Government has the 
power to grant licences that confer exclusive rights to "search and bore for and get" 
petroleum to a private party7. 
 
The UK Continental Shelf (UKCS) comprises those areas of the sea bed and subsoil 
beyond the territorial sea over which the UK exercises sovereign rights of exploration and 
exploitation of natural resources. The exact limits of the UKCS are set out in orders made 
                                                 
5 See further. Petroleum Act 1998. 2. Rights to petroleum vested in Her Majesty (2). 
6 The Energy Department Unit (part of BERR`s Energy Command) is responsible for licensing exploration 
and regulation development of UK`s oil and gas resources.  
7 See Further. Petroleum Act 1998. 3 Licences to search and bore for and get petroleum (1). 
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under section 1(7) of the Continental Shelf Act 1964.  In addition, agreements to divide the 
continental shelf according to the median line principles8 were concluded between Norway 
and UK in March 19659.  
 
The process to grant these licences involves close examination of the technical and 
financial capacity of these private parties by the BERR. The applicants for a licence 
(private party) shall first submit a proposal to the BERR, which will be reviewed and 
selected in a licence round process.  The rights granted by those licences will be limited to 
a specific area and for a limited number of years.  
  
Licences are very similar to contracts in their format, but they also contain many regulatory 
elements. The rights and obligations regulating the relationship between Government and a 
private party (licensee) are described in the licence and are also set forth in the Model 
Clauses. The Petroleum Act requires that such regulatory conditions – Model Clauses10 – 
be first published in a secondary legislation.  
 
In summary the seaward licensing system consists of 2 main types of licences: (i) 
Production Licences and (ii) Exploration Licences. Production Licences are the main type 
of seaward licence and despite their name they cover the entire life of an oil field from 
exploration to decommissioning. In an effort to promote new entrants in the UK sector, and 
making the UKCS an attractive business to smaller oil companies, the Government has 
introduced 3 variations of the Traditional Production Licence, such as Promote Licences, 
Frontier Licences and Licences specially drafted to cover the redevelopment of a 
decommissioned field. One of the main attractive differences between   these new licences 
and the traditional licences is that the new ones provide more flexibility in terms of 
                                                 
8 The median line is the line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines from 
which the breadth of the territorial seas of the neighboring states measured. 
9 Petroleum law compendium / Nordisk institutt for sjørett. - Oslo: Instituttet, 2003. – Book 1. pag. 9 
10 The model clauses currently in use for Seaward Production Licences  can be inspected on the OPSI (Office 
of Public Sector Information) website at the Petroleum Licensing (Production) (Seaward Areas) Regulations 
2008 (2008/225). Those used for Landward Production Licences and for Seaward Exploration Licences are at 
the Petroleum Licensing (Exploration and Production) (Seaward and Landward Areas) Regulations 2004 (No 
352) 
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minimum work obligation the licensees have to commit to in the initial term of the licence 
(i.e. exploration).   
 
The second main type of licence is the Exploration Licence. It is suitable for companies 
performing exploratory surveys over wide areas of the offshore sector. The rights granted 
by the Exploration Licence are neither exclusive nor limited to a specific area. It can thus 
cover any location within the UKCS, as well as allow exploration within an area already 
covered by an existing Production Licence. However, in this last case, an agreement with 
the holder of the particular Petroleum Licence will be required.  
 
According to the information displayed on the BERR website11: The UK’s licensing system 
covers oil and gas within Great Britain, its territorial sea and on the UK Continental Shelf 
(UKCS). Northern Ireland's offshore waters are subject to the same licensing system as the 
rest of the United Kingdom Continental Shelf. Northern Ireland issues its own Licences to 
cover its onshore area, independently of BERR. The Isle of Man issues Licences for its own 
onshore area and territorial waters.  
 
The designated area of the UKCS has been refined over the years by a series of 
designations under the Continental Shelf Act 1964 following the conclusion of boundary 
agreements with neighboring states. The most recent is the Scottish Adjacent Waters 
Boundaries Order 1999 (No. 1126) implementing an agreement reached with the Faeroe 
Islands. 
 
The development and production phases of oil and gas fields in the UK are also subject to a 
licensing regime and special regulations12 overseen by the BERR. A licensee wishing to 
develop a new field is required to apply for development consent to the BERR. This 
                                                 
11 See www.org.berr.gov.br 
 
12 Guidance notes on procedures for regulating offshore oil and gas field developments, issued by the BERR. 
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process is initiated by the submission of a Field Development Plan (FDP), together with an 
environmental statement13 discussing the environmental impact of the proposed 
development.  
 
The criteria used by the BERR when reviewing a field development program, are (i) the 
maximization of the UK economic benefit from its oil and gas resources, by ensuring the 
recovery of all economic reserves of hydrocarbons (ii) the environmental impact of 
hydrocarbon development and the interests of other users of the sea (iii) the need to ensure 
secure, diverse and sustainable supplies of energy to UK businesses and consumers at 
competitive prices, (iv) and finally, adequate and competitive provision of pipelines and 
facilities. 
 
In addition to the regulations and required criteria for the development of an oil and gas 
field, when a discovery is considered as having commercial potential, the licensees will be 
looking for the most cost effective development and this factor will mostly drive the 
decision of the optimum development solution. In brief, other factors as: water depth, 
weather conditions, proximity to infrastructures, proximity to markets and size of 
discovery, will influence such decision. 
 
As said in the introduction of this dissertation, the contracting strategy adopted by the oil 





                                                 
13 Environmental approval will also be required prior to FDP consent being given.  
 
 8
2.2 Norwegian Oil and Gas Industry 
  
Rights to explore and to produce subsea petroleum deposits under Norwegian jurisdiction 
are also organized through a licensing system, however, stronger interfaces with 
participation of the government are observed. Some of the particularities of the Norwegian 
licensing system will be addressed in this chapter.  
 
The Norwegian Jurisdiction is found in the international law and comprises Norwegian 
internal waters, Norwegian Sea territory, and the continental shelf14. The term continental 
shelf includes the seabed and subsoil of the marine areas extending beyond the Norwegian 
territorial sea, throughout the natural prolongation of the Norwegian land territory to the 
outer edge of the continental margin (but no less than 200 nautical miles from the base 
lines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured). However, not beyond the 
median line to another state, unless otherwise can be derived from the rules of international 
law for the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the base lines, or from an 
agreement with the relevant state15. 
 
The main characteristic of the Norwegian oil and gas industry is the indirect regulation of 
the sector by the government. Government interventions are present at each phase of the 
main activities required for exploration and production of oil and gas resources. 
 
The main legal text in Norway regulating the oil and gas sector in Norway is the Petroleum 
Act 199616  which reflects the principles of the European Economic Area Agreement17. The 
Norwegian licence system comprises of three types licences: (i) Exploration Licence, (ii) 
Production Licence and (iii) Pipeline Licence.  
 
                                                 
14 Petroleum law compendium / Nordisk institutt for sjørett. - Oslo: Instituttet, 2003. – Book 1. pag. 9 
15 Petroleum Act 1996, section 1-6 1. 
16 The Norwegian Petroleum Act was originally issued in 1985. 
17 The European Economic Area Agreement was signed 2 May and entered into force 1 Januray 1994 
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The Exploration Licence is granted for a limited area and a limited period. It does not 
confer exclusive rights, but it allows conducting of various kinds of surveys on the seabed 
in order to identify potential petroleum deposits. No rights to drill to obtain a further 
Production Licence are implied by the Exploration Licence. 
 
The Production Licence is the core licence of the Norwegian licensing system and grants 
the licensee exclusive rights of exploration, drilling and production of petroleum resources 
within limited area and time period. However, the Production Licence does not give the 
licensee the rights to build and operate a pipeline for the transportation of its petroleum to 
the market. Such rights will require a separate licence called the Pipeline Licence. 
 
The main purpose of a separate licence for pipeline activities is to give the owners of the 
pipeline an incentive to charge low transportation tariffs and to provide a self regulating 
mechanism. 
 
The development phase of an oil field can only start from the approval by the State of a 
development plan which shall be submitted by the licensee in relation to a commercial 
discovery. The criteria used by the Norwegian government for the approval of a 
development plan will be the complete or partial removal of the installation and the 
continued use of the facilities for petroleum or other purposes. 
 
The plan shall also contain an account of economic aspects, resource aspects, technical, 
safety related, commercial and environmental aspects, as well as information as to how a 
facility may be decommissioned and disposed of when the petroleum activities have 
ceased. The plan shall also comprise information on facilities for transportation or 
utilization comprised by Section 4-3 of the Petroleum Act 1996. In the event that a facility 
is to be placed on the territory, the plan shall in addition provide information about what 
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applications for required licences, which have been submitted according to other applicable 
legislation.18 
2.3 Oil and Gas Industry in Brazil 
 
The oil and gas industry in Brazil had an important period from 1995 to 1997, when the 
monopoly regime of the State over the activities of exploitation and production of 
hydrocarbon resources was changed by the introduction of a new flexible regime. The 
rights to explore and produce natural resources are still vested on the State19; however, the 
activities can be now performed (as authorized in a concession contract) by any private 
party20. Such change constituted an important development for the oil and gas industry in 
Brazil21. 
 
During the monopoly regime the management and performance of the activities involved in 
the exploration and production of oil and gas were exclusively vested on the semi-public 
petroleum company called Petroleo Brasileiro SA – Petrobras. As a consequence of the 
monopoly regime ending, a Petroleum Law (Law 9478/97) was issued by the Government 
and a Regulatory body for the oil and gas sector was created - the National Petroleum 
Agency (Agencia Nacional de Petroleo - ANP)22. 
  
The ANP was created for the purpose of (i) regulating the energy sector by issuing 
regulatory texts, (ii) selecting private parties and contracting with them through Concession 
Contracts for the exploration and production of hydrocarbons resources; (iii) supervising 
                                                 
18 Petroleum Act 1996, Section 4-2 
19 Petroleum Law (9478/97), provision No. 3. 
20 According to the Petroleum Law (9478/97), provision 5, such private party shall be a company 
incorporated under the laws of Brazil. 
21 Petroleum Law (9478/97), provision No.5.  
22 Petroleum Law (9478/97), provision No. 7, regulated by Decree No. 2.455/1998. 
 11
the regulated activities of energy sector, either directly or by agreements with the states and 
municipalities. 
 
The rights to explore, develop and produce hydrocarbon resources in Brazil are granted by 
Concession Contracts awarded to private parties through a bid rounds process23. Applicants 
for a block (limited area of seabed) should first pre-qualify as participants to the round by 
fulfilling certain technical and financial capabilities requirements and by paying a 
participation fee. Once the technical and financial requirements are satisfied, the applicants 
have to offer a signature bonus together with a proposal to the minimum commitment for 
the exploration works for each of the blocks they are interested in acquiring.  
 
The award criteria will be a combined analysis of the: (i) general work proposed by the 
applicant, (ii) the proposals for exploration activities, (iii) deadlines, (iv) minimum 
investment commitments, (v) the physical-financial chronogram (vi) and the government 
takes (in particular the signature bonus).  
 
All the phases of an oil field’s life, including exploration, appraisal, development, 
production and decommissioning are covered by the Concession Contract, although some 
inter-phase approvals will be required, such as the development plan approval.   
 
Despite the energy sector opening in Brazil, Petrobras is still the main player of the sector 
and, as such still demands most of the development activities in the country. 
 
As said in the introduction of this dissertation, recent oil discoveries in Brazil may 
represent a very promising and demanding market for development projects. According to 
information available at public domain, Petrobras will launch a tendering process for 28 
                                                 
23 Petroleum Law (9478/97), provision 23. 
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domestically-built deep-water rigs before the end of 2008, triggering a scramble for 
financing and yard slots in the country's offshore industry.24  
 
The 28 rigs form part of a wider plan to order 40 new deep-water and ultra-deepwater units 
over the next nine years as Petrobras prepares for a mighty appraisal and development 
effort on the huge new pre-salt oil and gas discoveries25 in the Santos basin26.  
2.4 Defining a contracting strategy  
 
For an oil company, the contracting strategy to adopt is without a doubt a key and critical 
parameter for the successful development of an oilfield. Before setting the overall 
contracting strategy, the following key parameters will normally be assessed by the oil 
company (or more precisely by the Operator – operating a particular oil field on behalf of 
the partners): 
1. The Operator’s standard for contracting strategy (execution model) 
2. The Operator’s partners guidelines (as well as the Joint Operating Agreement - 
JOA) 
3. The project’s environment (the country and legal framework where it will be 
operating)  
4. The definition of which work packages/contracts the field will be split into 
5. Timeline/schedule constraints and sequential vs. parallel project execution 
6. The allocation of risk and liabilities between the Operator (the client) and the 
Contractor(s). 
 
                                                 
24 "We will start tendering before the end of this year for the 28 rigs that will be built in Brazil and are 
scheduled for delivery from 2013 onwards " Petrobras chief executive Jose Sergio Gabrielli said. 
25 Petrobras has made what could prove to be the largest oil discovery in 30 years, and one that would propel 
the already prospering country into the major league of oil exporters.  
26 The Santos Basin is an 352,260 km² (136,008 sq mi) offshore pre salt basin. It is located in the south 
Atlantic ocean, some 300 km (190 mi) south east of São Paulo, Brazil. One of the largest Brazilian 




The series of standard agreements used in the development of an oil field will vary from 
Operator to Operator; however, some standards have been agreed at industry level in 
certain countries such as the UK and Norway and will be specifically discussed hereinafter. 
    
The parameters described in items (2) and (3) above will not be subject to consideration in 
this dissertation. 
 
When it comes to the definition of work packages (item 4 above), this is mainly driven by 
the maturity of the required technology, maturity of the Contractors – and by the own 
internal capabilities of the Operator.  Although we will not explore this further in this 
dissertation, it should be noted that Contractors work in a competitive environment, where 
the tendering/bidding process is normally quite strongly regulated by laws and the oil 
companies own standards. Therefore the main concern of potential Contractors will be the 
contracting strategy adopted by the oil companies. 
 
With respect to timeline/schedule constraints and sequential vs. parallel project execution 
 (Item 5 above), as mentioned in the introduction of this dissertation, the schedule 
constraints also influence the choice of contracting strategy.   
 
With the oil-prices we have seen lately (2007, 2008), the Operators are even more 
interested in getting the oil out of the ground and produce, and the share of so-called “fast-
track” projects has sky-rocketed.  By “fast-track” project is usually meant a project that 
includes some concurrent engineering and construction activities, meaning the decision is 
made to go ahead, as the advantages of achieving earlier oil/gas production outweighs the 
risk of rework (i.e. Contractors change orders). 
 
However, we will focus here on the last item of the above-given list of parameters to be 
considered by the Operators when defining a contracting strategy: allocation of risk and 
liabilities between the Operator and the Contractor(s).  As explained in the introduction, 
complexity and magnitude of oil and gas projects have further emphasized the need for a 
simplification of the contracting process, stressing the importance of determining a single 
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point of responsibility during the execution of the project and the allocation of risks and 
liabilities in a sustainable way for both Contractors and Operators.  
 
This trend is increasingly forced upon how Operators work, because of the current 
demographics in the oil industry.  As an illustrative fact, it can be mentioned that the oil 
industry had a significant downturn in 1986 world-wide, and this continued until about 
2001.  As a direct consequence of this, very few graduates selected to enter the oil industry 
during 15 years, selecting IT, telecom and other non- “brick and mortar” industries.  This 
has created a lack of seasoned professionals (15-25 years experience) which, together with 
the explosive demand today, will continue until well after 2020.  The direct consequence of 
this is that the Operators need to define contracting strategies which are not only causing 
the Operators themselves to use fewer personnel, but which in general also require less 
engineering.  From a technical point-of-view, this is partially achieved by standardization, 
including of course:  standardization of contracts and better (overall) allocation of risk and 
liabilities. 
 
In the traditional contracting strategies, oil companies would perform in-house engineering 
- including conceptual, basic and detailed engineering - procure key components, and 
finally assign the execution and construction of the project to a specialized Contractor. 
 
The EPC and/EPIC types of contracts have introduced new possibilities and new ways of 
proceeding by allowing Contractors to be entrusted with all phases of the project, thereby 
making Contractors the sole responsible entities for the delivery of a complete unit in a 
turn-key type of contract. 
 
As a result, Contractors are now entrusted with greater parts of the projects, which make 
them not only simple employee firms working for oil companies, but rather industrial 
partners sharing legal responsibility for the projects, and hence exposed more and more to 
liability issues. This is the reason why it is so crucial to precisely identify the different 
types of liability regimes put into place. 
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Another important motivating factor for this change of contracting strategy is the increase 
in complexity and technology involved in those projects; some oil and gas companies do 
not have in-house appropriate human resources for these new areas of expertise. 
 
Standardizing agreements also implies establishing a fair balance between rights and 
obligations of oil and gas companies on one hand and Contractors on the other hand; and 
most pre-printed ready-made agreement forms were negotiated and designed together by 





CHAPTER 3 STANDARD CONTRACTS 
 
3.1 Why standardizing agreements 
Standardizing contracts is a common business practice when it comes to buying goods and 
services in many different industries, including the oil and gas industry where 
standardization is a strong element. Many examples of this can be given, at all levels of an 
oil or gas project: from confidentiality agreements in the preliminary stages of discussions 
concerning the potential interest of a field, through to agreements between oil and gas 
companies and their Contractors at the start of the development phase (explored in this 
dissertation), to the agreements regarding the production phase of an oil field.  
 
However, unlike in most other industrial fields where agreements are standardized by an 
external authority, in the oil and gas industry, agreements and contracts are standardized 
directly by the main players in the field after negotiations between them. Therefore 
discussions about adhesion agreements and their legal effects will not be addressed here. 
 
Standardized agreements are attractive to oil companies mainly because they allow for a 
reduction of negotiation time. By using a standard agreement, the parties can rely on a 
document specifically designed to follow the main agreeable principles of the oil and gas 






3.2 Standard contracts – Norway, UK and Brazil 
 
As mentioned in the introduction of this dissertation, the oil industry in Norway was the 
first to present a standard form for fabrication of offshore installations and represented an 
important start-up in the standardization process in the oil and gas industry. The Norwegian 
experience was based on the discussions between Statoil ASA (Statoil) the Norwegian 
state-owned company, Norsk Hydro ASA (Hydro)27 and the Federation of Norwegian 
Industries (NI). As a result, the first draft of the Norwegian Fabrication Contract was issued 
in 1992, with its most recent edition published in 2007. 
 
The United Kingdom task force for the development of standard contracts came at a later 
stage, but with significant new contributions.  Not only by creating standard agreements, 
but the task force designed and implemented a global industry mutual hold harmless 
agreement covering all activities in the UK waters of the North Sea, which will be further 
explained in this dissertation. The initial works on standard agreements were handled by 
the CRINE (Cost Reduction Initiative for the New Era), an organization formed by senior 
executives from all sectors of the UK offshore industry – Operators, Contractors and 
suppliers - and as result the first edition of a “General Terms and Conditions for 
Construction” was published in June 1997. In 1999 a not-for-profit, wholly-owned 
subsidiary of Oil & Gas UK called LOGIC (Leading Oil and Gas Industry 
Competitiveness)28 was created and took over most activities initially handled by CRINE. 
An updated version of the Standard Contract - Construction - Edition 2 was issued in 
October 2003 and will be subject to comments in this dissertation. 
 
The Brazilian experience is still, at the time of writing, mostly focused on the contracts 
issued by Petrobras, which is the main and dominant Operator in the sector in Brazil. It 
                                                 
27 Statoil and Norsk Hydro’s oil & gas activities were merged together to StatoilHydro later (in 2007). The 
merged company will as per the shareholder agreement change name in 2009 (dropping both the Statoil and 
the Hydro name). 
28 www.logic-oil.com 
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should be clarified that such model form of contract has been modified on tendering-by-
tendering basis. The model which will be analyzed in this dissertation is based draft 
reviewed ABEMI (Brazilian association of industrial engineering)29 and from where the 
PNBV Contract was made available for this dissertation. 
 
The concepts of knock-for-knock and mutual hold harmless are still a challenge to be 
implemented in Brazil. The barriers extend from the legal system tied up in a civil code to a 
gape of understanding of the importance of the principles by the industry in Brazil.  
 
 
                                                 
29 ABEMI is profit free organization created in 1964 by a group of business man with the aim of having their 
engineering companies being represented towards their clients and to develop joint task force in order to add 
value to the sector. See further www.abemi.org.br. 
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CHAPTER 4 ALLOCATION OF RISKS 
4.1  The knock-for-knock principle 
 
The knock-for-knock principle was primarily developed during the Second World War 
between insurance companies. In those most dangerous times, it was common practice for 
merchant and commercial vessels to travel together in groups, as convoys, for obvious 
safety reasons. As a result of the physical proximity of the ships, accidents between them - 
knocking into each other - were most likely to happen and it was always extremely difficult 
to determine which ship was actually responsible for the knock. Therefore, in order to 
avoid endless and costly judicial litigations, insurance companies decided to establish a 
new liability regime that did not involve a responsible entity for the accident, and hence 
avoided the need for recourse against other insurance companies for the same insured 
event. The principle was to have each insurance company pay for the damages and losses 
sustained by its own policy-holder, regardless of who was responsible. 
 
The benefits of the knock-for-knock principle are multiple and extend from avoiding costly 
judicial litigation to the party who has suffered the losses, time consuming with the 
determination of who was responsible for the incident, to the avoidance of duplication of 
insurance policies for the same risks. However, a main point of concern in this dissertation 
is that the principle allows clarity of exposure to liabilities that a party to a contract will be 
assuming while performing such contract.  
 
Activities in the oil and gas industry are potentially hazardous and involve high level 
capital investments. From a service provider’s perspective, the level of exposure to losses 
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and damages to Operator’s property, personnel or other Contractors retained by the 
Operator at the same worksite, and, the level of exposure to loss of production of an oil 
field could not only lead to an unfair balance of obligations in a contract, and sometimes, 
even beyond Contractor’s insurance capability. 
 
Aside from the definition of the scope of work and negotiation of the contract price, the 
liabilities exposure are one of the key issues of a contract elements to be negotiated and 
because of the exhaustive negotiations and discussions around those risks the knock-for-
knock regime appeared as a reasonable and sustainable way of assessment and allocation of 
those risks (which can turn into billions of dollars of liabilities) that Contractors face while 
performing services at site for an Operator. As a consequence, the knock-for-knock 
principle has come to be an acceptable solution for both Contractors and Operators.  
 
4.1.1 Loss and damages  
 
As a starting point it should be clarified that the potential exposures to liabilities that will 
be the subject of appreciation in this dissertation and that is covered by the knock-for-
knock principle are those related to risks of: (i) loss and damages to property, (ii) personnel 
injuries, (iii) indirect or consequential losses. Therefore, the economic and time risk 
exposures resulting from default in the obligations specified in the contract such as: delay 
in performance, non-performance, defects, warranties to which remedies will often be 
provided by the general rules on breach of contract, will not be addressed in this 
dissertation. 
 
As previously explained, the main purpose of the knock-for-knock principle is to reallocate 
potential liabilities and to establish contractual rules stating that “where the damages hit, 
the damages stay”. In other words, each party shall support their respective losses resulting 
from an incident while performing a contract. In that respect, each party to a contract shall 
also indemnify the other from such losses and damages and waiver any rights of recourse 
against the other party to pursue the remedies available at law. 
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From a service provider’s perspective, the consequence of applying this principle is to 
clearly delimit a fence to Contractor’s exposure while performing services to or on behalf 
of an oil company. By assessing their risks, Contractors would be in a better position to 
evaluate the cost of services, to secure the risk by contracting an insurance coverage and by 
taking risks that be compatible with the level of their normal risk of business. 
 
The knock-for-knock principle is reflected in the contracts by the liabilities and indemnities 
provisions. An indemnity is a compensation for loss or liability. It is an express obligation 
to compensate by making a money payment for a defined loss or liability. It is not subject 
to the calculation of damages under the usual legal principles for calculation of loss. The 
loss may be caused by the party giving the indemnity (the “indemnifier”) or by another 
party. An indemnity is an original and independent obligation of the indemnifier to 
indemnify, and the indemnifier assumes primary liability for the loss or damage. 
 
In brief, the knock-for-knock principle will apply in the form of cross-indemnities where 
each party to the contract will take the responsibility for, and indemnify the other party 
from and against, damages and losses to its own property, loss or injuries to its own 
personnel and its consequential losses. Another relevant aspect of such indemnities are that 
they are usually intended to apply irrespectively of cause, even if caused by negligence, 
breach of statutory duty or breach of contract of the party receiving the benefit of the 
indemnity (indemnified party). However, the challenge of applying the knock-for-knock 
principle in offshore contracts was found in the respective statutory legal regimes. The 
question of whether exclusion/exemption types of clause such as the indemnity clauses 
would be enforceable at law, and therefore, recognized by judicial courts, is a great concern 
of the legal community.  
 
The experience under English Law shows that the Courts have upheld the knock-for-knock 
principle in contracts on the basis of the principles of freedom of contract and of a court’s 
function to give effect to parties’ agreement. However, the evolvement of court’s decisions 
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on this matter also demonstrates that not all and any indemnity would be enforceable by the 
Courts, thus compromising the original intent of the parties. As a result, special attention to 
the wording used in these provisions becomes increasingly crucial.  
 
One of the most important events in the North Sea, which led to several claims and as a 
consequence, opened high level discussions on the subject matter of the enforcement of 
indemnities provisions in offshore contracts, was the 1988 North Sea Piper Alpha 
disaster30.  
 
Many views can be expressed as to how to draft an effective liability provision, however 
the lessons learned from the court’s decisions in the Piper Alpha cases were of substantial 
contribution to the industry.  Knowing the courts’ views and interpretation of how those 
provisions would be effective is a precious guidance for the drafters.  
 
Among a number of court proceedings occasioned by the Piper Alpha disaster, there were 2 
specific cases relevant to the way of using indemnity regimes which were 1) the London 
Bridge case31; 2) the Orbit Valve case32.  
 
The main importance of the London Bridge case was the recognition by the Court that 
mutual indemnities was a “market practice” which had developed to take into account the 
particular features of the offshore operations and, therefore, was acceptable.  
 
Another important aspect of this case was the interpretation given by the Court of the 
indemnity provisions contained in the insurance contracts. In response to an argument 
raised by the Contractors (the defendants) that the Operators (the plaintiffs) would not be 
entitled to claim the indemnity provision given by the Contractors because the Operator 
had already been indemnified by their respective insurance policies, the Court decided that 
                                                 
30 The Piper Alpha disaster resulted in the total destruction of a gas production platform, loss of 167 lives and 
total insured loss was US$3.304 billion 
31 Caledonia North Sea Ltd v London Bridge Engineering Ltd [2002] UKHL4; [2002] 1 Loyd’s Rep 553, HL. 
32 EE Caledonia Ltd v Orbit Valve Co Europe Plc [1995] 1 All ER 174 Court of Appeal 
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the indemnity obligations in a contract are “full and primary”. In other words, the fact that 
the party which suffered the loss was insured for that particular liability and received 
compensation in that respect, does not restrict or relieve the primary obligation provided by 
an indemnity provision. If one of the parties maintains insurance, despite the indemnity 
provision contained in the contract, it is not for the benefit of the other party, but for its 
own exclusive benefit. Consequently, in that case, the Operator’s insurers were entitled to 
be subrogated to the rights of the Operator and to be compensated from the amount paid 
under the insurance policy.   
 
The Orbit Valve case was also relevant to developing the use of indemnity provisions. In 
this case the concept of (i) - clear drafting of the indemnity clause is required and (ii) for a 
“party who whishes to avoid consequences of its own negligence, clear language to this 
effect must be used in the relevant contract, were evolved from this decision. Based on 
these two concepts the drafters of indemnity provisions have come to include express 
wording  to that effect, such as “irrespective of negligence and/or breach of duty (statutory 
or otherwise)”.  
 
The court’s decision in the Orbit Valve case has confirmed the general principle of the 
English Law that indemnity clauses be interpreted restrictively and consequently the 
English courts will tend to narrowly construe the activities that are subject to 
indemnification. Where there is ambiguity, the indemnity clause will be interpreted in the 
manner least favorable to the party wishing to benefit from it. Accordingly, careful drafting 
is important when preparing indemnity clauses.        
 
Therefore, in case of a clause that would give an indemnity against “any claim arising from 
the manner of performance of the contract” it could not be construed to exempt negligence. 
In summary, in the absence of clear words the parties to a contract are not to be taken to 




In addition to the Piper Alpha cases, it should also consider the trilogy of cases in the 
House of Lords33 from which the classic rules of contractual interpretation have evolved 
from literalism to purposiveness shall also be taken. These cases are Mannai Investment Co 
Ltd v Eagle Star Assurance Co. Ltd34, Investors Compensation Ltd v West Bromwich 
Building Society35 and Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA v Ali36. The effect of 
these decisions is that “Almost all the old intellectual baggage of “legal” interpretation has 
been discarded”37 
 
Another equally poignant remark was made by Lord Hoffmann in Mannai Investment Co 
Ltd v Eagle Star Life Assurance Co Ltd, was the following: 
 
“The meaning of words, as they would appear in a dictionary, and the effect of their 
syntactical arrangement, as it would appear in a grammar, is part of the material which we 
use to understand a speaker’s utterance. But it is only a part; another part is our 
knowledge of the background against which the utterance was made. It is that background 
which enables us, not only to choose the intended meaning when a word has more than one 
dictionary meaning but also … to understand a speaker’s meaning, often without 
ambiguity, when he has used the wrong words.” 
 
Another example of the above, is the English case of West Bromwich, the Court admitted 
that extrinsic evidence may be used in limited circumstances to assist the interpretation of 
the contract, meaning that extrinsic evidence could be used to establish the meaning of 
words if they clearly can not have been intended to be given their ordinary meaning.  
 
In summary, in terms of the rules of contractual interpretation which will be of relevance 
for the indemnities provisions are the following:  
                                                 
33 Vincent, Nelson QC. Interpretation of Contracts: The Rules of Re-Written for Modern Times (handout) at 
pages. 3 and 4. 
34 [1997] 2 W.L.R. 945 
35 [1998] 1 W.L.R. 896 
36 [2002] 1 A.C. 251 
37 Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society op.cit. per Lord Hoffman at p.912.   
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(1) “A clause must extend to the exact event that occurred for the party relying on it to 
be protected. If the clause is too narrow in its terms, it will not cover the obligation 
or liability it seeks to exclude or restrict. For example, an exclusion of liability for 
consequential loss or damage will not cover direct losses. 
(2) A clause may be drafted in such a way that its application might create an absurdity 
or defeat the main purpose of the contract. For example, a deviation clause in a bill 
of lading may be so wide that it could be applied in a way inconsistent with the 
main purpose of the contract voyage. The courts will try to give effect to the 
contract and clauses inconsistent with the main purpose of contract will be 
ineffective. 
(3) Construction contra proferentem: according to this rule, an ambiguity in a 
document is construed against the party seeking to rely on the ambiguous clause. In 
addition, when a party seeks to rely on an exemption clause, it bears the burden of 
proving that a case falls within the exemption and any ambiguity will be resolved in 
favor of the other party. 
(4) There is no rule of law to prevent the exclusion or restriction of liability arising 




                                                 
38 (1) Chitty on Contracts, 29th edn (2004), Vol 1, para 14-006; BHP Petroleum Ltd and Others v British 
Steel plc and Dalmine SpA [1999] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 583, 597-600; in Caledonia North Sea Ltd v London Bridge 
Engineering Ltd [2000] UKHL 4; [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 572, Lord Hoffmann reserved, in the context of 
claims to be indemnified for compensation paid to victims at levels higher than those which would have been 
available through the Scottish courts, on the question of the distinction between ‘direct’ and ‘indirect or 
consequential’ losses; Westerngeco Ltd v ATP Oil & Gas (UK) Ltd [2006] EWHC 1164 (Comm). 
(2) Chitty on Contracts, 29th edn (2004), Vol 1, para 14-007; Leduc v Ward (1888) 20 QBD 475. 
(3) Chitty on Contracts, 29th edn (2004), Vol 1, para 14-009; Westerngeco Ltd v ATP Oil & Gas (UK) Ltd 
[2006] EWHC 1164 (Comm). 
(4) Chitty on Contracts, 29th edn (2004), Vol 1, para 14-016; Red Sea Tankers Ltd v Papachristidis [1997] 2 
Lloyd’s Rep 547, 586. 
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4.1.2 Third Party claims  
 
Apart from the exposure of risks in relation of properties and personnel owned by each 
contracting party and the indirect or consequential losses, there is another point of exposure 
related to risks of claims arising from third parties. As third party should be understood 
those not directly involved in the particular agreement, but who can be affected by its 
operation. As already stated above, offshore operations are potentially hazardous and the 
development of oil field involves a series of contracting of goods and services. 
 
The numbers of Contractors performing services in an oil field are multiple (in the North 
Sea, particularly, it is not unlikely that 25 to 50 Contractors would be working side by side 
on the same project) and most of them will be linked to the Operator through 
separate/individual contracts. As there will not be any contractual relationship between 
Contractors, they would therefore be considered as third parties towards each other.  
 
Irrespective of all improvements and regulations in terms of health and security of offshore 
workers, the occurrences of personal injuries during an offshore operation are still 
considerably high.  If all Contractors working next to each other are considered as "third 
party" Contractors, these parties will be exposed to liabilities for injury and loss they cause 
to each other. 
 
The allocation of risks in relation to damages sustained by those third parties can be 
assumed by either the Operator or the Contractor. In light of the knock-for-knock regime, 
the allocation of liability in relation to third parties will differ in the sense that the party 
which caused the damages will normally be responsible and compensate for such damages. 
Such concept is similar to the traditional and statutory legal regimes, in order words it is a 
negligence-based liability. 
 
However, it is not uncommon that the indemnity provisions would be drafted in a way that 
the party which was given the indemnities would also indemnify the other party against the 
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members of its group. Therefore, the definition of a party’s group would include some third 
parties that would be affected in case of an accident.  
 
In practical terms and as far as the definition of Contractor’s group is concerned it would 
be desirable that such definition include: Contractors’ employees, agents and 
subcontractors. In the case of a company the definition should include its employees, 
affiliates, co-ventures and other Contractors engaged by the company to provide services in 
the relevant area of operations. This approach is also referring to the expansion of the 
contracting party’s definition.       
 
In order to give effect to that expansion, it is advisable that each of the contracting parties 
celebrates the so called “back-to-back” arrangements with each of the persons and 
companies included in their respective definition.  By back-to-back agreement it is 
understood a contractual arrangement where the terms and conditions of the main contract 
are passed onto the sub-contractor on back-to-back terms.  
 
Another practice that used to be common in the offshore operation in the UK was the 
implementation by the Operators of mutual hold harmless schemes (for people, property 
and consequential loss) on an installation-by-installation or a project-by-project basis. 
Under these schemes, Contractors essentially agree to hold each other harmless for loss, 
damage, injury, etc, to their people and property, even if caused by the negligence and/or 
breach of duty of another Contractor.  
 
As an evolution of such practice, the oil and gas industry in the UK have developed an 
industry wide mutual hold harmless agreement which has been successfully accepted by 
most of the Offshore Contractors in the UKCS and will be addressed in next the chapter of 





4.2 Industry mutual hold harmless scheme  
 
Despite all efforts to allocate the potential risks arising from an offshore activity through 
the evolvement of the knock-for-knock principle, the enlargement of the definition of a 
contracting party and the mutual hold harmless regime on a project-to-project basis, the 
allocation of third parties’ liability was not ideal and remained a potential issue, causing 
lots of disputes between Offshore Contractors. 
 
The traditional contractual regime between Contractors and Operators stipulated that each 
of the parties would be responsible for its own negligence towards a third party. Unless a 
particular contract states otherwise or unless a Contractor makes a specific arrangement 
with all potentially affected third parties any time they go offshore, potential liabilities 
towards such third parties would be unlimited.   
 
The alternative solution developed by the oil and gas industry in the UK was the creation of 
the mutual hold harmless scheme between Offshore Contractors (the “IMMHH scheme). 
Such scheme was a significant contribution of the UK oil and gas industry and clarified the 
allocation of third parties’ liability in offshore operations.  
 
In summary, by ways of a deed of adherence to the industry mutual hold harmless deed 
(IMHH Deed), each of its signatories39 agreed to “create between them a mutual hold 
harmless and cross-indemnity arrangement to apportion liability and responsibility 
between themselves and their respective Groups so that each Signatory is responsible for 
its own Property, Personnel and Consequential Loss and the Property, Personnel and 
Consequential Loss of each other member of its own Group. The Signatories acknowledge 
and agree that such apportionment of liability is common practice in the offshore oil and 
gas industry in the United Kingdom. Such apportionment of liability is made for good 
                                                 
39 By signatories it is should be understood the Offshore Contractors which have signed up to the IMHH 
Deed. 
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commercial and insurance reasons, principally to ensure that each Signatory is able to 
insure and/or manage the risk to which it is exposed during Services.”40  
 
Another feature that contributed to the enforcement of the IMHH Deed was the Contracts 
(Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999. Such Act made possible under the English Law the 
ability to pass the benefit of indemnities to third parties, hence contracting parties’ 
respective “groups” (their affiliates and personnel).  
 
In practical terms, the IMHH Deed was drafted to cover the absence of a contractual 
relationship between Contractors working offshore in the UK continental shelf, and 
allocates the potential liability resulting from their offshore activities. In the absence of the 
IMHH Deed, the statutory negligence regimes would apply.  
 
However, other purposes can be attributed to the IMHH scheme, such as: 
- clarifying the allocation of the key areas of risk; 
- bringing financial benefits from reduced legal fees; 
- being more effective in managing of key areas of risk; 
- reducing time and confrontation when negotiating contractual responsibility 
and indemnity matters; 
- leading to greater industry collaboration; 
- potentially reducing insurance premiums; 
- avoiding unnecessary overlap of insurances policies; 
- and finally, being cost-effective and efficient means of improved risk 
management for small- and medium-sized enterprises.41  
 
The method proposed by the IMHH Deed (with associated deeds of adherence) covers 
UKCS offshore operations and applies where no contractual relationship otherwise exists 
between the Parties. However, it should be noted that the scheme does not cover 
                                                 
40 IMHH Deed - whereas (B) and (C).  
41 See further – www.imhh.com. 
 30
helicopters, certain vessels (emergency response, rescue vessels, heavy lift vessels and 
supply vessels) and genuine visitors. 
 
According to data extracted from the IMHH Industry website42 “it is believed that the 
industry as whole will make a significant financial saving from an effective implementation 
of the IMHH Scheme. It is impossible to put precise figures on this saving but industry 
discussions have suggested that a saving in legal fees of £17MM per annum may be 
possible. In addition to this there are the internal costs of all the parties involved in claims 
and counter claims which must be significant. The benefit across the industry could exceed 
£20MM per annum. Whilst these figures are merely indicative, they do reinforce that the 
potential prize is worth pursuing.  
 
There may also be benefit in reduced insurance premiums. The legal burden incurred by 
the oil and gas industry is also, to some extent, reflected in the insurance industry. Reduced 
claims and counter claims may lead to a reduced level of legal fees for insurers which 
would hopefully have a knock-on effect on insurance premiums. However, risks in the 
industry will not change: the IMHH Scheme is simply a method of allocating liability. The 
IMHH Scheme should reduce the need for “double insurance” but does not remove the 
need for insurance altogether. 
In addition to the financial penalty on the industry, there is the hidden cost of regular 
confrontation within the industry in contractual negotiations on liability and indemnity 
matters. The IMHH Scheme will not remove the risks but will allow them to be managed 
more effectively.”   
The IMHH Deed is administered by LOGIC and has 221 signatory companies.   
 
 
                                                 
42 See www.imhh.com 
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4.3 The exclusion of gross negligence and willful misconduct. 
Discussions on the interpretation of knock-for-knock clauses have been concerned with the 
exclusion of gross negligence from their indemnity regime. Such exclusion has received 
several criticisms, in particular, from insurance people43, as in such case liability would 
revert to being allocated under applicable law and consequently would increased the 
exposure to liabilities if a party acts with gross negligence. 
 
The main problem with this approach is that some jurisdictions, in particular common law44 
ones, do not have a precise definition for gross negligence or willful misconduct. 
Moreover, the common law system traditionally does not recognize different degrees of 
negligence: there can only be either a breach of a duty of care which results to negligence 
or no negligence at all. Therefore, a clear definition of gross negligence and willful 
misconduct is fundamental for the effectiveness of these two concepts. 
 
The term “negligence”, in its ordinary sense, is fairly understood in most of legal systems 
and avoids disputes around whom and what should be considered as negligent/negligence. 
In simple terms, negligence shall constitute a failure to comply with the standard of care 
reasonably expected from a person - failure to act with the expected degree of care, 
competence, and skills. Therefore, when a contract provides for the exclusion of gross 
negligence, the degree of negligence that raises the act/omission up to being a gross failure 
should be clearly identified. 
 
Another issue with the exclusion of certain degrees of negligence from a knock-for-knock 
indemnity is to demonstrate that a gross negligence or willful misconduct actually took 
                                                 
43 See further – Presentation at Standard Offshore Forum – Jennings, Barbara and Frew, Vivian (first 
published in Lloyd’s List).  
44 The system of laws originated and developed in England and based on court decisions, on the doctrines 




place. In that sense, the definition negotiated in the contract will be determinant and shall 
be carefully drafted. 
  
When it comes to Romano German legal system45, the concepts of different degrees of 
negligence are more understandable and some definition can be found in their respective 
legislation.  
4.4 Drafting Effective Indemnities Provisions   
 
Based on the lessons learned from the English law cases and the evolution of indemnities’ 
provisions in standard contracts, it is possible nowadays to effectively prescribe some 
relevant advice in order to draft effective indemnities provisions. 
 
4.4.1 Basic structure of an indemnity provision 
 
The basic structure of an indemnity provision shall contain: 
 
A Party (…) indemnifies (…) a Group (…) from and against Claims (…) for certain 
subject matters (…), relating to the Contract/Works, for certain categories of loss and 
damages (…) irrespective of negligence and/or breach of duty (statutory or otherwise) 




                                                 
45 The “Romano-Germany system” is found in all Latin America, Continental Europe, most of Asia and 
Africa. The system is based on codified rules which aim to provide the framework of the law and to provide 
the judge with the guidelines for decision. 
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In general terms, indemnities are mutual or reciprocal – that is to say that each party gives a 
similar indemnity to the other. It is also important to mention that an indemnity is not given 
by a Group, as a Group is not party to a contract and therefore, can not take on obligation 
under the contract. However, as already explained in this dissertation, the benefits of an 
indemnity provision can be expanded to other parties to the contract, and to that effect a 
definition for “Group” will be necessary. 
 
(b) Indemnifies  
 
It can often be found in indemnities provisions that the indemnifying party not only 
indemnify but also be asked to be responsible for/ liable for/ release for/ 
save/defend/indemnify and hold harmless. From a legal perspective this extensive list is not 
really relevant. Nevertheless, some of this wording has a clear recognized meaning under 
English law and could be useful for a general understanding of each, as follows: 
 
“to indemnify” means to reimburse costs and/or losses, expenses, liabilities, damages etc, 
that the other party has suffered as a result of specified events – it is a financial obligation. 
 
“to release” – when a party releases the other party from legal liabilities, it is different to 
indemnification and would mean that such party would not be able to sue the other party. 
 
“To hold harmless” – partially implies a meaning similar “to release” in terms each 
company agreeing not to sue the other for certain losses. However, the meaning may go 
further to include a proactive obligation to stop or prevent other people from bringing 
actions insofar as within the control of that party. There is an element of preventing a 
dispute arising as well as holding the other party harmless from a dispute that has already 
arisen. 
 
“To defend” contains some element of overlap. The indemnifying party will prevent third 
parties (or members to their group) from causing harm to the indemnified party. This can 
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also mean that the indemnifying party will reimburse the indemnified party if such party 
was sued by someone of the indemnifying party’s group. 
 
Based on the above definition, it can be concluded that the necessary elements for drafting 
are “defend, indemnify and hold harmless”. Other inclusions would not confer any 
additional protection to the indemnified party. 
 
(c) Group 
     
The definition of Group of either, as the party who is given the indemnification or the 
beneficiary, shall be as wide as possible in order to include all the people, persons, 
subcontractors who might be affected by the operations under a specific contract. Special 
attention must be given to the wording in order to deal with directors and thought must be 
given to determining whether there are other categories of people who should be included 
such as secondees and visitors. Another important concern is to know whether the 




The definition of claims is also relevant and would normally include: all claims, liens, 
judgments, awards, remedies, debts, liabilities, damages, costs, losses, and expenses, 
(including legal expenses) or causes of action of whatever nature [including without 
limitation those made or enjoyed by dependants, heirs, claimants, executors, 
administrators, successors, survivors or assigns]. 
 
(e) Categories of loss and damages  
 
The usual matters of an indemnity provision would normally cover: (i) people (death, 
injury and illness) and (ii) property (owned, leased, hired or otherwise provided), against 
damaged, loss and recovery. 
 35
 
With respect to the coverage for loss of and damages to property and people, it should be 
mentioned the usual deviation from the knock-for-knock indemnity regime in the 
construction contracts should be mentioned where the Contractors may take risk of loss and 
damages during the construction phase (project property46). However, such deviation 
would normally be mitigated by an insurance coverage. Other matters may be contemplated 
in an indemnity clause, such as: Third Parties claims, pollution risks, damages and losses to 
reservoir and catastrophic losses. 
 
The indemnification against consequential losses will normally be assessed by a specific 
clause in the contract and very often will be preceded by the formula: “Notwithstanding 
anything to the contrary provided herein”. As a consequence of some English cases47, the 
definition of consequential losses will normally include: (i) Consequential or indirect loss 
under applicable law and (ii) loss and/or deferral of production, loss of product, loss of use, 
loss of revenue, profit or anticipated profit (if any), in each case whether direct or indirect 
to the extent that these are not included, and (iii) whether or not foreseeable at the effective 
date of the commencement of the contract. 
 
However, the extensive list of consequential losses may not be necessary for common law 
jurisdictions, where general concept of consequential losses are well recognized, such as in 
Brazilian Law48.   
 
It is also important to expressly mention the relationship of the clause to the contract, in 
other words, expressions such as: “arising out of the Contract”, “arising out of the 
Works/Services” or “connected with the Contract” are extremely important. 
                                                 
46 By project property should be understood as the scope of work. Also referred to as the “Contract Works”. 
47 See – British Sugar plc-v-NEI Power Projects Limited, Deepak Fertilosers and Petrochemical 
Corporation-v-Davy Mckee (London) Limited and ICI Chemicals & Polymers Limited, BHP Petroleum 
Limited-v-British Steel plc, and Haddley-v-Baxendale. 
 
48 See further – GONÇALVES, Carlos Roberto – Responsabilidade Civil - 94. Conceito e requisitos do dano 
– pages 529-532   
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(f) Irrespective of negligence and/or breach of duty (statutory or otherwise) 
As previously discussed, in the context of the Orbit Valve case it is crucial that the 
indemnity clause expressly provide the wording “irrespective of negligence or breach of 




Some exceptions to the application of an indemnity clause can be specified and will depend 
on several issues such as: legal requirements under the governing law of the contract, 
common contracting practice by each of the parties to that particular contract, requirements 
for a specific type of contracts. Such exceptions shall be carefully reviewed on case-by-
case basis. Several examples of such exemptions can be mentioned: (i) “exclusion in the 
event of gross negligence/willful misconduct”, (ii) “damages arising from negligence of the 
counter party” (e.g. third parties), (iii) “damages whether solely and directly caused by one 
of the parties”, or (iv) “except where relating to” or “to extend that (…)”, which will be 
determined specifically. 
 
4.4.2 Overall cap  
 
Although the Operator will often take the liability for risks which Contractors would not be 
able to insure against (such as third parties infrastructure, damages to reservoir or 
pollution), this still leaves substantial areas of potential liability for Contractors (in 
particular the costs of remedying defective performance or contract/permanent works49).  
 
In order to prevent unlimited liabilities, the parties to a contract can negotiate an overall 
cap of liabilities50. Furthermore, for those circumstances where the liability for third parties 
                                                 
49 See herein below - item 4.5.1 (a) Loss or damages to properties and personal injuries.  
50 Overall cap of liability can also be referred in contracts to as “absolute cap”, “total cap”, “global cap” or 
“limitation of liability”   
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has been left to the applicable law, a properly drafted global cap may limit the Contractor’s 
exposure.  
 
However, in order to give effect to such overall limitation to Contractor’s liabilities it is 
important that the Operator also indemnify the Contractor against the liabilities resulting 
from the excess of such limitation. Otherwise, the Contractor will remain exposed to 
unlimited liabilities.     
 
It is also important to mention that it is appropriate for the global cap not to cover those 
areas where the Contractor has been indemnified by the Operator against the Operator’s 
own losses and it may also be appropriate to carve out indemnities in other areas. 
Nevertheless, it is not appropriate to carve out termination provisions as termination may 
well follow on from contract breach, and it is precisely in this situation that a Contractor 
needs to be protected against an unquantifiable, thus uninsurable loss.  
  
4.5 Liabilities and indemnities provisions in standards agreements     
 
In order to give a practical view of the knock-for-knock principle and how to draft effective 
liability and indemnity provisions in offshore contracts, it will be presented some examples 
of provisions contained in standard agreements used in the UK (LOGIC), Norway (NF07) 
and Brazil (PNBV Contract). In general term the views and comments which will be made 
under this chapter will take into account the Contractor’s risk perspective. 
 
As it will be illustrated in this chapter the standard contracts used in the North Sea (LOGIC 
and N07) perfectly reflects the knock-for-knock principle, thus provides a reasonable 
allocation of liabilities. It will also be demonstrated as counter-example to the regimes 
developed in the North Sea, the liability provisions contained in the PNBV Contract.  
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By reviewing those clauses it will be an opportunity to evaluate some of the exposure to 
risks51 that Offshore Contractors will have while performing offshore contracts in UK, 
Norway and Brazil. 
 





22.1 The CONTRACTOR shall be responsible for and shall save, indemnify, defend and hold harmless the 
COMPANY GROUP from and against all claims, losses, damages, costs (including legal costs) expenses and 
liabilities in respect of: 
 
(a) loss of or damage to property of the CONTRACTOR GROUP whether owned, hired, leased or otherwise 
provided by the CONTRACTOR GROUP arising from, relating to or in connection with the performance or 
non-performance of the CONTRACT; and 
 
(b) personal injury including death or disease to any person employed by the CONTRACTOR GROUP 
arising from, relating to or in connection with the performance or non-performance of the CONTRACT; and 
 
(c) subject to any other express provisions of the CONTRACT, personal injury including death or disease or 
loss of or damage to the property of any third party to the extent that any such injury, loss or damage is 
caused by the negligence or breach of duty (whether statutory or otherwise) of the CONTRACTOR GROUP. 
For the purposes of this Clause 22.1(c) "third party" shall mean any party which is not a member of the 
COMPANY GROUP or CONTRACTOR GROUP. 
 
22.2 The COMPANY shall be responsible for and shall save, indemnify, defend and hold harmless the 
CONTRACTOR GROUP from and against all claims, losses, damages, costs (including legal costs) expenses 
and liabilities in respect of: 
 
                                                 
51 Such type of risk analysis can also be referred as Risk Assessment and represents one of the forms to 
mitigate risks. 
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(a) loss of or damage to property of the COMPANY GROUP whether (i) owned by the COMPANY GROUP, 
or (ii) leased or otherwise obtained under arrangements with financial institutions by the COMPANY 
GROUP which is located at the WORKSITE arising from, relating to or in connection with the performance 
or non-performance of the CONTRACT, but excluding the PERMANENT WORK; and 
 
(b) personal injury including death or disease to any person employed by the COMPANY GROUP arising 
from, relating to or in connection with the performance or non-performance of the CONTRACT; and 
 
(c) subject to any other express provisions of the CONTRACT, personal injury including death or disease or 
loss of or damage to the property of any third party to the extent that any such injury, loss or damage is 
caused by the negligence or breach of duty (whether statutory or otherwise) of the COMPANY GROUP. For 
the purposes of this Clause 22.2(c) "third party" shall mean any party which is not a member of the 
CONTRACTOR GROUP or COMPANY GROUP; and  
 
(d) loss of or damage to such permanent third party oil and gas production facilities and pipelines and 
consequential losses arising there from, as specified in and defined in and in accordance with Appendix 1 to 
Section I – Form of Agreement where such loss or damage is arising from, relating to or in connection with 
the performance or non-performance of the CONTRACT. The provisions of this Clause 22.2(d) shall apply 
only to such specified permanent oil and gas production facilities and pipelines which are within a 500 metre 
radius of any working barge or vessel which is at the time directly engaged in the construction or installation 
of the PERMANENT WORK but not while such working barge or vessel is in transit to or from the area 
where the PERMANENT WORK is to be constructed or installed or when performing any other operations. 
The provisions of this Clause 22.2(d) shall apply notwithstanding the provisions of Clause 22.1(c).  
 
22.3 Except as provided by Clause 22.1(a), Clause 22.1(b) and Clause 22.4, the COMPANY shall save, 
indemnify, defend and hold harmless the CONTRACTOR GROUP from and against any claim of whatsoever 
nature arising from pollution emanating from the reservoir or from the property of the COMPANY GROUP 
or from any third party property described in Clause 22.2 (d) arising from, relating to or in connection with 
the performance or non-performance of the CONTRACT. 
 
22.4 Except as provided by Clause 22.2(a) and Clause 22.2(b), the CONTRACTOR shall save, indemnify, 
defend and hold harmless the COMPANY GROUP from and against any claim of whatsoever nature arising 
from pollution occurring on the premises of the CONTRACTOR GROUP or emanating from the property and 
equipment of the CONTRACTOR GROUP (including but not limited to marine vessels) arising from, relating 
to or in connection with the performance or non-performance of the CONTRACT. 
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22.5(a) Subject to Clause 22.5(b), the CONTRACTOR shall be responsible for the recovery or removal and 
when appropriate the marking or lighting of any wreck or debris arising from or relating to the performance 
of the WORK or the property, equipment, vessels or any part thereof provided by the CONTRACTOR 
GROUP in relation to the CONTRACT, when required by law, or governmental authority, or where such 
wreck or debris is interfering with COMPANY operations or is a hazard to fishing or navigation and shall, 
except as provided for in Clause 22.2 and Clause 22.3, save, indemnify, defend and hold harmless the 
COMPANY GROUP in respect of all claims, liabilities, costs (including legal costs), damages or expenses 
arising out of such wreck or debris, whether or not the negligence or breach of duty (whether statutory or 
otherwise) of the COMPANY GROUP caused or contributed to such wreck or debris. 
 
22.5(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of Clause 22.1, where the COMPANY provides transportation for the 
property of the CONTRACTOR GROUP to the offshore WORKSITE, and the COMPANY elects to, or is 
required by law or governmental authority to recover or remove or mark or light any wreck or debris of such 
property, the COMPANY shall, except as hereinafter provided, save, indemnify, defend, and hold harmless 
the CONTRACTOR GROUP from and against any claim of whatever nature relating to the costs of such 
recovery, removal, marking or lighting. Provided, however, that the foregoing indemnity and hold harmless 
shall not apply to the extent that the recovery, removal, marking or lighting arises as a result of the 
negligence or breach of duty (whether statutory or otherwise) of the CONTRACTOR GROUP. 
 
22.6 All exclusions and indemnities given under this Clause 22 (save for those under Clauses 22.1(c), 22.2(c) 
and 22.5(b)) and Clause 25 shall apply irrespective of cause and notwithstanding the negligence or breach of 
duty (whether statutory or otherwise) of the indemnified party or any other entity or party and shall apply 
irrespective of any claim in tort, under contract or otherwise at law. 
 
22.7 If either party becomes aware of any incident likely to give rise to a claim under the above indemnities, 
it shall notify the other and both parties shall co-operate fully in investigating the incident. 
 
22.8 Where applicable and if requested by CONTRACTOR in writing, the COMPANY shall make available to 
the CONTRACTOR details of its other contractors to be present at the WORKSITE. 
 
25. Consequential Losses 
 
For the purpose of this Clause 25 the expression “Consequential Losses” shall mean: 
 
(i) consequential or indirect loss under English Law, and 
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(ii) loss and/or deferral of production, loss of product, loss of use, loss of revenue, profit or anticipated 
profit (if any), in each case whether direct or indirect to the extent that these are not included in (i), and 
whether or not foreseeable at the EFFECTIVE DATE OF COMMENCEMENT OF THE CONTRACT.  
 
Notwithstanding any provision to the contrary elsewhere in the CONTRACT and except to the extent of any 
agreed liquidated damages (including without limitation any predetermined termination fees) provided for in 
the CONTRACT, the COMPANY shall save, indemnify, defend and hold harmless the CONTRACTOR 
GROUP from the COMPANY GROUP’S own Consequential Loss and the CONTRACTOR shall save, 
indemnify, defend and hold harmless the COMPANY GROUP from the CONTRACTOR’S GROUP own 
Consequential Loss, arising from, relating to or in connection with the performance or non-performance of 
the CONTRACT.   
 
(a) Loss or damages to properties and personnel injuries. 
 
The clauses 22.1 (a) (b) and 22.2 (a) (b) are a classic examples of cross indemnities based 
on the knock-for-knock principle. In such clauses, both Contractor and Company (normally 
the Operator) agree to indemnify each other in respect of loss and damages to property 
owned by each of the parties and for its own personnel.  
 
It can also be noted that the lessons learned from Orbit Valve case are address by the 
wording of clause 22.6, as contains an express exclusion of negligence from the indemnity 
provision termed: “irrespective of cause and notwithstanding the negligence or breach of 
duty (whether statutory or otherwise) of the indemnified party or any other entity or party 
and shall apply irrespective of any claim in tort, under contract or otherwise at law”. 
 
However, Clause 22.2(a) provides one exception to the indemnities given by the company 
which is in respect of loss and damages to the “Permanent Work”. According to the 
definition contained in the contract, as a Permanent Work shall be considered: “property of 
the Company arising from the Work”. Such exclusion is very common in offshore 
construction contracts and it will normally be mitigated by an overall cap of liabilities 
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(b)  Loss or damages to properties and personnel injuries to Third Parties.  
 
With respect to loss and damages towards third parties, clauses 22.1 (c) and 22.2 (c) 
provides a negligence-based liability, as often provided by offshore contracts. In such case, 
each one of the parties, Contractor and company, will assume liability caused to third 
parties as a result of their own negligence.  
 
From a Contractors’ perspective, important for third parties’ liability is the definition of 
“Companies Group”. It is desirable to have as expanded as possible a definition in order to 
include all possible third parties which might be affected by the activities during the 
performance of the contract, such as its Co-ventures, Affiliates, personnel and other 
Contractors.53      
 
Furthermore, the Logic standard form has an important re-allocation of third parties’ 
liability from a Contractor’s perspective which is not found any other standard form. In 
clause 22.2 (d) liabilities for “loss or damages to permanent third party oil and gas 
production facilities and pipelines and consequential losses arising there from” were 
assumed by the Company. This exclusion represents an optimum allocation of liability for 
Offshore Contractors, in particular for those obligations in the contract that requires 
offshore activities. 
  
Furthermore, it should be mentioned the benefits available to all Offshore Contractors in 
the UK through adherence to the IMHH scheme. As been explained in this dissertation, 
such scheme represents a full cross indemnities by and between the Offshore Contractors in 
                                                 
52 See further - Annexes - Logic Contract – Clause 36.1(a) and (b). 
53 See further Annexes – Logic Contract – 1 Definitions “COMPANY GROUP”  
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respect to loss and damages to their own property and personnel. Once more, that is an 
optimum allocation of liability. 
 
      
(c)  Consequential Losses 
 
Clause 25 above is another example of an effective cross indemnity provision for 
consequential losses under English Law. Given the lack of clear definition of consequential 
losses available under English Law, the parties who intend to avoid such exposure of 
liability is required to provide an extensive definition of what should be considered as a 
consequential loss.  
 
Yet, such extensive list of consequential losses might not be necessary under other 
jurisdictions, especially within the Romano-Germanic system, therefore, it is important to 
take into account the opinion of a legal counsel from such jurisdiction.     
 
4.5.2 NF 07– Liability clause 
 
PART VIII LIABILITY AND INSURANCES  
 
Art. 29 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO THE CONTRACT OBJECT OR COMPANY 
PROVIDED ITEMS 
 
29.1 If loss of or damage to the Contract Object occurs between the start of the Work until 
the time when the Delivery Protocol has been signed or should have been signed in 
accordance with Art. 19.1 and 19.2, Contractor shall carry out necessary measures to 
ensure that the Work is completed in accordance with the Contract. The same applies if 
any loss of or damage to Materials or Company Provided Items occurs while they are at 
Site under Contractor Group's safekeeping and control. 
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Contractor's obligation to carry out measures stated herein applies regardless of whether 
negligence in any form has been shown by Company Group. 
 
29.2 The costs of carrying out such measures as are stated in Art. 29.1 shall be borne by 
Contractor unless the damage is caused by Company Group or the damage is due to war, 
nuclear damage or terror. 
 
Contractor's liability for such costs for any one occurrence is, however, limited to the 
deductibles for insurer's own risk under Company's insurance policies set forth in Art. 
31.1, and in any event limited to a maximum of NOK [1, 5 or 7 millions] [to be determined 
in accordance with the provisions in the Protocol art. 4], provided that: 
 
a) the loss or damage is covered by insurance policies as mentioned, or 
 
b) the loss or damage is not covered by the insurance policies mentioned above as a result 
of circumstances for which Company carries the risk. 
Art. 30 EXCLUSION OF LIABILITY. INDEMNIFICATION  
 
30.1 Contractor shall indemnify Company Group from and against any claim concerning: 
 
a) personal injury to or loss of life of any employee of Contractor Group, and 
b) loss of or damage to any property of Contractor Group, and arising out of or in 
connection with the Work or caused by the Contract Object in its lifetime. This applies 
regardless of any form of liability, whether strict or by negligence, in whatever form, on the 
part of Company Group. 
 
Contractor shall, as far as practicable, ensure that other companies in Contractor Group 
waive their right to make any claim against Company Group when such claims are covered 
by Contractor's obligation to indemnify under the provisions of this Art. 30.1. 
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30.2 Company shall indemnify Contractor Group from and against any claim concerning: 
 
a) personal injury to or loss of life of any employee of Company Group, and 
 
b) loss of or damage to any property of Company Group, except as stated in Art. 29, 
 
and arising out of or in connection with the Work or caused by the Contract Object in its 
lifetime. This applies regardless of any form of liability whether strict or by negligence, in 
whatever form, on the part of Contractor Group. 
 
Company shall, as far as practicable, ensure that other companies in Company Group 
waive their right to make any claim against Contractor Group when such claims are 
covered by Company's obligation to indemnify under the provisions of this art. 30.2. 
 
 
30.3 Until the issue of the Acceptance Certificate, Contractor shall indemnify Company 
Group from: 
 
a) costs resulting from the requirements of public authorities in connection with the 
removal of wrecks, or pollution from vessels or other floating devices provided by 
Contractor Group for use in connection with the Work, and 
 
b) claims arising out of loss or damage suffered by anyone other than Contractor Group 
and Company Group in connection with the Work or caused by the Contract Object, 
even if the loss or damage is the result of any form of liability, whether strict or by 
negligence in whatever form by Company Group. 
 
Contractor's liability for loss or damage arising out of each accident shall be limited to 
NOK 5 million. This does not apply to Contractor's liability for loss or damage for each 
accident covered by insurances provided in accordance with Art. 31.2.a) and b), where 
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Contractor's liability extends to the sum recovered under the insurance for the loss or 
damage. 
 
Company shall indemnify Contractor Group from and against claims mentioned in the first 
paragraph above, to the extent that they exceed the limitations of liability mentioned above, 
regardless of any form of liability, whether strict or by negligence, in whatever form, on the 
part of Contractor Group. 
 
After issue of the Acceptance Certificate, Company shall indemnify Contractor Group from 
and against any claims of the kind mentioned in the first paragraph above, regardless of 
any form of liability, whether strict or by negligence, in whatever form, on the part of 
Contractor Group. 
 
30.4 Contractor shall indemnify Company Group from claims resulting from infringement 
of patent or other industrial property rights in connection with the Work, or Company's use 
of the Contract Object. Nevertheless, this does not apply where such an infringement 
results from the use of Drawings, Specifications, Company Provided Items or process  
licences nominated by Company from Third Parties. 
 
Contractor's liability shall be limited to infringements in the country where the Contract 
Object, in accordance with the Contract, is to be used, and in the countries in which the 
Site(s) are located. 
 
30.5 A party shall promptly notify the other party if it receives a claim that the other party 
is obliged to indemnify. Whenever possible, the other party shall take over treatment of the 
claim, provided always that Company shall handle all claims which may result in liability 
under Art. 30.3, third and fourth paragraph. 
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The parties shall give each other information and other assistance needed for handling the 
claim. Neither party shall, without the consent of the other party, approve of a claim which 
shall be indemnified, in whole or in part, by the other party. 
 
PART IX LIMITATION AND EXCLUSION OF LIABILITY Art. 32 LIMITATION AND 
EXCLUSION OF LIABILITY 
 
32.1 Company shall indemnify Contractor Group from Company Group's own indirect 
losses, and Contractor shall indemnify Company Group from Contractor Group's own 
indirect losses. This applies regardless of any liability, whether strict or by negligence, in 
whatever form, on the part of either group and - except as stated in Art. 17.3 and 24.2 - 
regardless of any other provisions of the Contract. 
 
Indirect losses according to this provision include but are not limited to loss of earnings, 
loss of profit, loss due to pollution and loss of production. 
 
32.2 Contractor's total liability for breach of contract, including liability in accordance 
with Art. 24, 25 and 26, and regardless of whether the Contract is terminated or not, shall 
be limited to 25% of the Contract Price. 
 
(a) Loss or damages to properties and personnel injuries. 
 
In general terms the NF 07 reflects the knock-for-knock principles and also provides 
alternative solutions to allocate Contractor’s liabilities. 
 
The cross indemnities in respect to loss or damages to properties and personal injuries are 
described in clauses 30.1 (a) (b) and 30.2 (a) (b). Similarly to the examples available in the 
Logic Contract, each of parties agrees to sustain their respective losses to their properties 
and personnel and indemnify each other in respect of such losses. 
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Once more54 the exemption will lie on the contracts works (defined in the NF07 as 
“Contract Object”), which is a common characteristics of construction contracts. However, 
clause 29.2 provides a limitation for such liability to the deductibles for insurer’s own risk 
under the Company’s insurance policies. This is a very good example of an alternative 
solution for allocation of liability. 
 
(b)  Loss or damages to properties and personnel injuries to Third Parties.  
 
Here is another example of negligence-based liability for loss and damages towards third 
parties. Therefore, the parties will be responsibility for the loss and damages caused to third 
parties due to its own negligence.  
 
Given the absence of a mutual hold harmless scheme in Norway, the definitions of the 
company and Contractor’s Group and the overall cap of liability will play an important role 
in allocating and mitigating such risk.  
 
With respect to the definitions of Company’s Group, the NF07 includes Company’s 
Contractors as much as they are involved in the particular project covered by the Contract. 
As already explained, this expansion of company’s definition is an acceptable way of 
allocation for third parties liabilities. However, it would still remain some potential 
exposure to other third parties which are not directly involved in the project, but 
nevertheless would be affected. 
 
Based on the above, it will be extreme relevant for the Contractor to negotiate an absolute 
limitation such liability. Clause 30.3 provides a limitation of liability to NOK 5 million for 
each accident.  In addition, company provides an indemnity to Contractor in case such 
liability exceeds the limited amount per accident. Those provisions provides for an 
acceptable solution of allocation of such liabilities.   
 
                                                 
54 See comments herein above - (e) Categories of loss and damages. 
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(c)  Indirect Losses and Global Cap 
 
By indirect losses it could be understood those issues concerned to consequential losses and 
which were subject to several consideration in this dissertation. The definition of indirect 
losses includes loss of earnings, loss of profits, loss due to pollution and loss of production. 
It should be mention that such definition is more expanded comparing to the LOGIC 
Contract as it also includes loss due to pollution.  
 
Clause 32.1 is an example of cross indemnity in respect to indirect losses suffered by each 
of the parties resulting from the performance of the contract. This indemnity is consistent 
with the principles of reasonable allocation of liabilities in an offshore contract. Therefore, 
each party shall indemnify the other party from its own indirect losses.  
 
With respect to the global limitation of Contractor’s liability provided in clause 32, that 
should represent an overall limitation of Contractors liability where the contract does not 
provide either an indemnity or a specific limitation. Instead of expressly excluding such 
provisions (indemnities or limitation provisions) the clause provide that the over all 
limitation shall affect liabilities for breach of contract.  
 
The limitation is based on a percentage of the contract price and it represents a fair and 
reasonable limitation in respect breach of contract by Contractor. The traditional remedies 
available at law would be enough to compensate the company from its losses as a 
consequence of a breach of contract, however, that would represent a huge and unlimited 
exposure to liability to contract. Therefore, the limitation provided by the NF07 is adequate 






4.5.3 PNBV Contract – Liability clause 
 
In this section it will be present the liability clause of the PNBV Contract for construction 
of semi-submersible Unit. PNBV55 is the contractual vehicle used by Petrobras when 
contracting with companies out side of Brazil.  
 
The governing law of the contract is the English Law and which effects have already been 
considered under this dissertation.   
 
22.1 Contractor Indemnity.  Subject to the other provisions of this Agreement, 
Contractor, on behalf of itself, its Affiliates, successors, assigns, officers, directors, 
employees, and agents, agrees to indemnify, defend, and hold harmless [PNBV], [PNBV] 
Project Manager, and their respective Affiliates, subsidiaries, successors, assigns, officers, 
directors, employees, and agents, from and against any and all liabilities, losses, expenses, 
and claims for personal injury or property damage that arise from or out of Contractor's 
negligent acts or omissions in the performance of the Work.  Contractor Parent Company 
will guarantee the full and faithful performance of all obligations of Contractor under this 
Agreement in the form attached as Exhibit XXV hereto. This guarantee is unconditional 
and irrevocable. 
 
22.2 [PNBV] Indemnity. Subject to the other provisions of this Agreement, [PNBV], on 
behalf of itself, its Affiliates, successors, assigns, officers, directors, employees, and agents, 
agrees to indemnify, defend, and hold harmless Contractor, Contractor Project Manager, 
and their respective Affiliates, subsidiaries, successors, assigns, officers, directors, 
employees, and agents, from and against any and all liabilities, losses, expenses, and 
claims for personal injury or property damage that arise from or out of [PNBV's] negligent 
acts or omissions under this Agreement.   
 
                                                 
55 Petrobras Netherlands B.V (PNBV), a company incorporated under the laws of Holand and a full 
subsidiary of Petrobras. 
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[22.6 Limitation of Liability. The aggregate amount of Contractor's liability to [PNBV] 
for Liquidated Damages for Delay shall not exceed xx% (xxxx percent) of the Contract 
Price, and any such liabilities shall be limited to direct damages suffered by [PNBV] or 
any of its subsidiaries or Affiliates as an end user of the Facility. However, such 
limitation of liability shall not apply to any damages resulting from Contractor's gross 
negligence, willful misconduct, or willful refusal to perform the Work.  The aggregate 
amount of Contractor's liability to [PNBV] for damages suffered by [PNBV] as a result of 
Contractor’s violation of Environmental Laws and indemnification obligations of 
Contractor hereunder with respect to damages or injuries sustained by third parties are 
not subject to any limitation. This Section 22.6 shall not be construed to limit Contractor's 
other obligations or liabilities arising under or in connection with this Agreement. This 
Section 22.6 expressly survives the termination of this Agreement. 
 
Consequential Damages. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Agreement to the 
contrary but except for the provisions of Section 20.5, in no event shall [PNBV] or 
Contractor be liable to each other for any indirect, special, incidental or consequential loss 
or damage (other than such damages as may be included as a component of liquidated 
damages hereunder) including, but not limited to, loss of profits or revenue, loss of 
opportunity or use incurred by either Party to the other, or like items of loss or damage; 
and each Party hereby releases the other Party therefrom. 
 
(a) Loss or damages to properties and personnel injuries. 
 
Clauses 22.1 and 22.2 are examples of liability provisions based on the negligence of the 
parties to the contract. It constitutes the classic position at law and can not be construed as 
an indemnity according to the knock-for-knock principle. 
 
Central to this conclusion is the wording “any and all liabilities, losses, expenses, and 
claims for personal injury and property damages that arise from or out of [Contractor's] 
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negligent acts or omissions in the performance of the Work.” In order words, each of the 
parties will be responsible for any claims resulting from its own negligence. 
 
When it comes to Contractor’s liability, clause 22.1 goes even further as it requests a 
guarantee for the performance of the Contract in the form of a Parent Company 
Guarantee56 from the Contractor’s parent company, worded as follows: “will guarantee the 
full and faithful performance of all obligations of Contractors under this Agreement.”  
 
Although clause 22.2 provides the same exposure to liability (except guarantee obligation) 
for the Operator, such liability regime is proving to establish a disproportionate balance 
between Contractor and Operator. 
 
As previously explained57, it is an industry common practice in the North Sea that each 
company (including Contractors) will assume liabilities related to their own people and 
property. Such concept was a necessary development of the activities in the oil and gas 
industry and many benefits have arisen from the mutual hold harmless (or knock-for-
knock) regime. 
 
From a Contractor’s perspective, the critical aspect of a negligence-based liability for 
damages to Operator’s property and personnel is the financial capacity of a Contractor to 
assume those liabilities. Most frequently, the financial capacity of a Contractor to assume 
those types of liability is inferior by far to the capacity of the Operator on the other hand. In 
some cases, insuring is not even possible or will be a duplication of insurance policies for 
the same events.  
   
Another relevant aspect of these two clauses is that both are “Subject to the other 
provisions of this Agreement”. In that case, all other provisions of the contract should be 
                                                 
56 Parent Company Guarantee is a promise to take responsibility for another company's financial obligation if 
that company cannot meet its obligation. The entity assuming this responsibility is called the guarantor. 
57 See hereinabove Chapter 4 – Allocation of Risk. 
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counter-reviewed against these provisions, in particular clauses providing overall cap of 
liabilities. 
 
(b)  Loss or damages to properties and personnel injuries to Third Parties.  
 
With respect to third party’s liability, clause 22.6 provides a clear wording that “with 
respect to damages or injuries sustained by third parties are not subject to any limitation”. 
Therefore, the liability that a Contractor may assume towards third parties is unlimited. 
 
Such exposure represents a massive area of potential liabilities and the only form of 
mitigation that will be available to Contractors is an insurance policy. However, and 
without any doubts, the cost of such insurance will affect the Contractor’s proposal and 
inevitably be passed over to the Operator in the contract price.  
 
As mentioned above, the Operator will most probably secure said same risk under their 
own policy, which will only cause duplication of insurance policies for the same events, 
thus proving not cost effective.   
 
(c)  Limitation of liability and Consequential Losses 
 
As explained in this dissertation, where the contract left the allocation of certain liabilities 
to traditional negligence available at law, the limitation of liability provisions will play a 
significant role in the contract. Clause 22.6 of the PNBV contract provides some relevant 
limitations to liabilities; however, the wording used in the clause is not as clear as it should 
be.  
 
The first topic to be mentioned is the limitation for the Delay in the form of liquidated 
damages. Although the contract does not provide a definition for the term “Delay”, the 
following could be considered as a definition: the delay to deliver the contract works. Such 
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limitation represents an important allocation of Contractor’s liability, considering that the 
contract provides that “time is of the essence”58. 
 
The issue of liquidated damages was not previously discussed in this dissertation as it is not 
one of risks normally allocated or mitigated through knock-for-knock regime. However, 
given inclusion in the overall limitation of liabilities contained in the PNBV Contract, a 
brief consideration will be given. 
 
The main reason for pre-establishing the amount of damages in a contract is to release the 
party who has suffered the damages from the burden to have to proof such damages. In 
other words, the parties agree that, for certain events (such as delays), a fixed amount shall 
be paid by the party that caused the event and, such compensation shall be effective 
irrespective of the actual damages (if any).     
 
Therefore, when clause 22.6 provides that “any such limitation shall be limited to direct 
damages suffered by PNBV or any of its subsidiaries or Affiliates as an end user of the 
Facility” it affectes the whole point of having a liquidated damages provision in a contract. 
 
In summary, contrarily to the main purpose of a liquidated damages provision, in the event 
of delay caused by Contractor, PNBV will have to prove that: 1) there were damages as a 
consequence of the delay, and ii) the damages were direct. Such an approach is actually 
another limitation to the Contractor’s liability for delay. 
 
Another critical issue with clause 22.6 is the exceptions of gross negligence, willful 
misconduct and willful refusal to perform the Work, as those terms are not defined in the 
contract. As already explained in this dissertation, the problem arises from the fact that 
those terms have no defined meaning under English Law, therefore, a contractual definition 
is crucial for the application of the concept. That is because, even though the role of 
                                                 
58 Using the term ”time is of the essence” makes the timing in the contract a condition and missing deadlines 
therefore a breach entitling termination. 
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English courts of giving effect to the intention of the parties in a contract, the English 
courts do not make a distinction between negligence and gross negligence. Unless the 
contract explicitly states so the case will be reviewed on the bases of ordinary negligence. 
 
With respect to the exclusion of consequential losses, once more the wording needs to be 
improved in order to guarantee a better effectiveness under English law. As been 
exemplified by the English Law cases herein discussed, such wording as: “defend, 
indemnify and hold harmless”, “irrespective of negligence or breach of duty (statutory or 
otherwise)” or “arising from the performance of this Agreement” should be included in 
any indemnity provision. 
 
Although the provision of the PNBV Contract has never been challenged by the time this 
dissertation is written, based on the previous English law cases it can be concluded that 
those provisions might not be construed as limitation of liabilities for consequential losses. 
Therefore, the effects of the traditional negligence available at law would be considered by 





CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION 
 
The knock-for-knock principle is the one of the central legal pieces supporting the offshore 
contracts. The potential hazards involved in the offshore activities are multiple; therefore 
the allocation of liability provided by the knock-for-knock principle is a reasonable 
solution in that context. Moreover, it has a positive impact in terms of timing consuming 
with negotiation and it is insurance cost effective. 
 
However, the correct application of the principle requires a certain maturity of the local 
industry. A good examples of this maturity is found in the standard agreements developed 
in North Sea are and they represent a great source of examples on how such principles 
should be reflected in the contracts. The contribution that comes from the North Sea can 
also be referred in the English court cases and the evolvement of a mutual hold harmless 
scheme between Offshore Contractors in the UK. 
 
From a Contractor’s perspective the exposure to liabilities for personnel injuries and/or loss 
or damages to offshore facilities, either belonging to Operators or other Contractors, is 
massive and simply not compatible with their normal risk of business. The consequences of 
such liability to Contractor can be beyond their financial capacity and sometime not even 
mitigated by insurance.  
 
Without the knock-for-knock principle, it would be a disproportion between the obligations 
and liabilities assumed by and between the Operator and the Contractor. This has special 
significance in a development phase of an oil field, where several Contractors would be 
performing different services at the same site.  Considering the particular context of the 
offshore industry, the knock-for-knock principle is a reflection of the proportionate risk and 




The allocation of liability provided by the knock-for-knock principle avoids the application 
of ordinary negligence provided at law and creates a contractual regime where each party 
will be responsible for their own losses. In practical terms it’s an agreement of non-
recourse against the other party even if the damages were caused by such party. 
  
In the reviews presented in this dissertation it made clear that such concept of risk 
allocation is fully understood and implemented in the North Sea, opposed to the currently 
situation in Brazil. Part of this discrepancy can be attributed to the maturity of the oil and 
gas industry in North Sea, where licensing rounds back to the year of 1964.    
 
In summary, it can be concluded that the exposure to liabilities that an Offshore Contractor 
assumes in the North Sea is limited to the performance of their scope of work in the 
contract. Therefore, all those issues related to (i) loss and damages to property owned by 
each contracting parties, (ii) personal injuries, death or illness of personnel, (iii) indirect 
or consequential losses and (iv) third party claims arising out of personnel injuries, illness 
or death, or property loss or damages suffered by third parties, are reasonably allocated on 
a knock-for-knock basis. 
  
Another factor that contributed to the development of such principle in the North Sea can 
be attributed to the challenging of such principle toward the English courts. As reviewed in 
this dissertation, the Piper Alpha cases were a confirmation that the indemnities provisions 
are enforceable under English law.  
 
During the period of researching for this dissertation it was concluded that the oil and gas 
industry in Brazil has not yet developed standard form of offshore contract as it is seen in 
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the North Sea. The offshore contracts currently used in Brazil are drafted by Petrobras and 
made part of their calls for tenders59.  
 
The draft made available for the present analysis was relevant as a counter example of the 
knock-for-knock principle. In brief, the exposure to liabilities assumed by an Offshore 
Contractor in Brazil is based on negligence. That could be construed as an opposite 
solution given by the knock-for-knock principle. 
 
In summary, it can be concluded that the standard forms of agreements are of great 
assistance for the oil and gas industry. The examples available in the North Sea reflect the 
advanced discussions around the knock-for-knock principle and could be of assistance to 





                                                 
59 A “call for tender” is term used for the procurement for purchase of goods and services.   
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ABBREVIATIONS AND DEFINITIONS 
 
- BERR: Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform. 
- Contractor (or Offshore Contractor): term referred to a service provider 
company in the oil and gas industry. 
- EPC: Engineering, Procurement and Constructions. 
- EPIC: Engineering, Procurement, Installation and Construction. 
- FDP: Filed Development Plan. 
- Licensee: holder a licence. 
- LOGIC: Leading Oil and Gas Industry Competiveness. 
- NF07: Norwegian Fabrication Form (2007). 
- Offshore Contract: same as Contractor. 
- Operator: term used to refer to an oil company (holder of an oil and gas 
licence) and which retain the services of a Contractors. 
- PNBV: Petrobras Netherland BV. 
- UK: United Kingdom. 
- UKCS: United Kingdom Continental Shelf. 
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- Guidance notes on procedures for regulating offshore oil and gas field 
developments, issued by the BERR. 
 
Norway 
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petroleum activities. Last amended by Act 14 December 2001 No 98, 28 
June 2002 No 61, 20 December 2002 No 88, 27 June 2003 No 68, 7 January 
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